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Abstract 
 
The wave of „Arab Spring” has generated an atmosphere of hope and 
enthusiasm within and beyond the borders of the Arab World. The journalists 
termed the process as the ,,Arab revolution”1, and it was expected that the 
downfall of old dictators would bring about basic changes in North Africa and 
the Middle East. Nevertheless, the results have remained limited yet. Although 
some authoritarian leaders have left the scene, this does not automatically 
mean a regime change. The structures and the reliable persons of the former 
dictators are still in power, as it is obvious in the case of the key country of the 
region, Egypt. If the protesters of the „Arab Spring” would like to reach a real 
breakthrough, which the scientists can call ,,revolution”, they must continue the 
efforts to transform the political and economic system of their countries into a 
modern one, which is able to give adequate answers to the internal and 
external challenges of the 21st century. Although there is no silver path for the 
success in this transformation, and each country should find her own way, it is 
likely that the halfway measures will not bring the hoped better life for the 
Arabs, and these insufficient solutions will only increase the gap between the 
different parts of the society – and between the Muslim world and the West. 
 
Introduction 
According to the famous writer Hannah Arendt, we can speak about 
revolution only if the use of violence leads to the creation of a totally new 
political structure, which breaks with the structures of the past, and it determines 
itself as a new beginning.
2
 The overthrowing of a dictator does not mean per se a 
,,revolution”, because the structure of an authoritarian regime is more stable, and 
there is no leader who can maintain his power alone. In most cases, an 
authoritarian regime forms its client-system, which, through the security 
services and the army, serves as the basis of its power. But if the society can no 
longer bear the rule of the dictator, and it becomes evident that he must go, some 
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key persons of the regime can join the demonstrations. It happened so in Egypt: 
after the first days of the rebellion, the army decided to support the changes and 
no longer supported Mubarak. But the leaders of the armed forces and the 
police, who served as the main basis of the Mubarak regime, did not lose their 
power, and they are playing a crucial role in the current politics of the ,,new” 
Egypt, too. 
 The classic examples of revolution were in 1789 or in 1917, when the 
figures of the ,,ancient regime” were expelled or executed, and not only the 
persons of the leadership changed, but also the whole structure of the political 
and economic life. 1789 or 1917 really meant a ,,new beginning”, and the 
revolutionists radically tried to break away from the elements of the former 
regime. 
 ,,Revolution” is a fashionable term. But not every demonstration is a 
revolution. In the Arab World we can mostly see demonstrations, not 
revolutions. Now it seems that perhaps some demonstrations can be called 
“revolution” – e.g. in the case of Tunisia –, but the definition is unsure, because 
we can recognize a revolution by its effects and results – not by the words of the 
participants. And this will need much more time. 
The dynamics of the unrests 
The reasons behind unrest can be numerous: they can have roots in social, 
religious or ethnic tensions, political suppression or economic crisis. Sometimes 
they feed upon only the political sphere of the society, and the protesters 
demand more freedom and human rights, but in other cases we find that the 
insufficient living conditions are the main motives under the surface. The 
beginning of riotings is often spontaneous, and a peaceful demonstration 
transforms into a more violent protest. It happened in Western Sahara, where the 
funeral of Saharavi activist Hamdi Lembarki – killed by the Moroccan police – 
became a huge mass demonstration.
3
 These riots often serve for channelling 
tensions, and if the authorities are careful, and do not try to immediately 
suppress the rioting, after some days the protestations can lose their power. We 
can see this scenario realized in most of the Arab countries: the authoritarian 
leadership agreed and made some limited reforms, which were enough to calm 
the protesters. But in some states, the regime was not so wise: the Power does 
not show any willingness for changes and even uses brutal violence against the 
demonstrators. This gave impetus to the fragmented and disorganized opposition 
to come together into one platform and become stronger than ever. If the 
strength and the support of the opposition is big enough, it can very easily lead 
to a civil war, like in Greece after WWII or in Spain in the ‘30s. In addition, a 
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civil war usually does not remain only an inner policy issue; in both of the 
aforementioned conflicts, it could be observed that the external actors played a 
crucial role in the war. 
 The revolutionists can seize the power if they have small, but organized 
elite which is capable of driving the processes, giving direction to the events and 
obtaining the support of the people. If the unrest cannot produce such a group, 
the protests can lead to anarchy and chaos, which finally results in legitimating 
the rule of the former regime. 
 Till the end of 2010, North Africa was considered as a relatively stable 
part of the world. The nationalist, authoritarian leaders of the region came to 
power in the ‘60s and ‘70s, and it seemed that their rule would never end. They 
survived the Cold War, the Arab-Israel wars, the collapse of the CCCP and the 
,,War on Terror” campaign. The regional status quo was more or less acceptable 
for the dictators, the West and the ,,rest of the world” – e.g. the BRICS countries 
–, too, and because of this consensus the analysts considered that the status quo 
is sustainable.
4
 Therefore, the unexpected events in Tunisia, and then in Egypt, 
shocked the international system, and the great powers needed weeks to react to 
the unrests. 
 
 
The Egyptian oil production. The decline of the exports cut the endowment of the main 
consumer’s goods, which undermined the social and economic security in the 
country.
5 
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The Arab dictators of the Cold War era usually came to power by revolutions. 
But these new leaders – Gaddafi, Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saleh – did not provide a 
new way of ruling for their people. They often based their power on the newly 
revealed oil-fields, which allowed moderate welfare for their citizens without 
the broadening of their political rights, and this compromise worked well until 
recently. 
 But the depletion of the natural resources undermined the power of the 
regimes. The social investments and the endowments declined, and the living 
standard decreased. The middleclass – which was the leading force of the 
demonstrations – started to come down, and it was evident that with the 
exception of a very small group (the close adherents of the dictators), the whole 
society only lost under the rule of the dictatorial regimes. The corruption, the 
nepotism, the lack of freedom and other human rights only strengthened the 
dissatisfaction. The traditional problems of the region as the demographic boom, 
the desertification, the lack of drinking water, and the current economic crisis 
also contributed to the blast. The unemployment rate among the youth was 
critical, and these people could be easily won for the demonstrations. In this 
environment, the last years’ moderate economic reforms could not raise the 
living standards on the contrary, they increased the gap between the different 
social classes.
6
 As a result of the crisis in Europe, many Arab immigrants 
working in Europe lost their job, and they could no longer send money home to 
their families. 
 Besides the economic reasons, several other factors also contributed to the 
birth of the „Arab Spring”. One of the main causes of the problems in many 
countries is the tribalism: the dictators always preferred their own tribesmen to 
hold the key positions in government. As in general in Africa, the principle of 
the ,,winner takes all” was true in the Maghreb, too. The structure and the basis 
of the power were not political, but familiar and tribal. This is the reason why 
the Libyan protesters are trying to arrest everybody from the Gaddafi family, 
and why they launched a war against the Gaddafi tribe instead of trying to 
negotiate.  
 As already mentioned, the interests of external actors also play a crucial 
role in the conflicts. In the multipolar world, the USA, the EU, the BRICS 
countries or Iran all try to utilize the situation according to their own interests, 
which leads to conflict between these actors. This can be clearly seen in the case 
of Iraq, Bahrain and Oman. Iran gives serious support to the protesters from the 
background in order to strengthen the Shiite groups, which would increase Iran’s 
power in the Gulf and the Middle East.
7
 This is, however, unacceptable for the 
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USA. The loss of the US RQ-170 Sentinel drone shows that there is an ongoing 
secret war between the two countries.
8
 
 The situation is similar in Libya, where the biggest loser of the fall of 
Gaddafi is Italy, while the positions of France and the UK seem to be 
strengthened. The NATO air strikes also underlined the importance of the region 
for Europe, which can be a strong message for Russia and China. 
 Last but not least, we should explore the role of the Islamists in the 
unrests. At the beginning, it seemed that the fears of the West would not be 
confirmed: the demonstrators had no links with the radical Islam groups, and the 
ideology and the catchwords of the protesters were not dominated by anti-Israel 
or anti-West feelings. Furthermore, the al-Qaida needed – similarly to the 
Western politicians – long weeks to react to the events, but nobody dealt with it. 
The main ideological framework of the unrests was not Islamism, but the 
demand of the Western rights for freedom and equality.
9
 Nevertheless, it did not 
mean that the Islamist remained passive. In the anarchy and chaos, some 
Islamist organizations significantly increased its power. Although most of them 
are officially moderate, and in their declarations the winner Ennahda Islamist 
Party in Tunisia
10
 and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco promised
11
 
an open society, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, it is 
unquestionable that some radical Islamist groups became stronger in the region. 
The murder of a Polish catholic priest in Tunisia
12
 and the attacks against the 
Coptic churches in Egypt
13
 show their increasing power and influence. Some 
former mujahideen got leading power in the new political structure, like Abdel 
Hakim Belhaj in Libya, who earlier had fought against the Allies in 
Afghanistan.
14
 Although none of them is openly against the Western values and 
relations, it is hard to determine how strong their commitment is in the field of 
human rights and some Arab type of democratization. Later we will examine 
this problem in more detail. 
 After the general exploration of the „Arab Spring”’s circumstances, we 
will try to arrange in groups the events of the different countries and determine 
whether we can call them ,,revolutions” or not. In most cases we will see that 
                                                 
 
8
 http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-12/iran-shows-downed-spy-drone-as-u-s-assesses-
technology-loss.html. Downloaded: 14-12-2011. 
 
9
 Elham Fakhro – Emile Hokayem: Waking the Arabs. Survival, 53:2, 2011, 23–24., 26. 
 
10
 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/10/tunisia-ennahda-islamist-party_n_1087006.html. 
Downloaded: 15-12-2011. 
 
11
 http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/235/140392/No+Islamic+Dress+Code+for+Moroccan+ 
Women?destId=355491. Downloaded: 15-12-2011. 
 
12
 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/uk-tunisia-priest-murder-idUKTRE71H5RR20110218. 
Downloaded: 15-12-2011. 
 
13
 http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Attacks-against-Coptic-churches,-part-of-a-plan-to-expel-
Egypt%E2%80%99s-Christians-22828.html. Downloaded: 15-12-2011. 
 
14
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14786753. Downloaded: 15-12-2011. 
 10 
they were not revolutions, and the power systems of the old regimes are still 
strong. 
 
Moderate reforms without breakthrough 
After the first wave of the „Arab Spring”, most of the leaders of the Arab 
States had to implement moderate reforms. These changes did not affect the 
basic principles of the political system or the rule of the countries: the main aim 
of them was to calm the protesters and prevent further demonstrations. In some 
cases it was enough that the monarch or the president appointed new 
government officials, promised economic reforms and new workplaces. This 
happened in Oman, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Iraq. The opposition has 
become legal, like in Morocco the currently winner Islamist party. The state of 
emergency, which was in place for decades, was suspended as in Algeria by 
Abdelaziz Bouteflika. It seems that these steps were enough until now. But it is 
only the surface. The main question is whether the leaders of these countries are 
able to cope with the challenges of the new environment. Most of the economic 
problems remained, and they can be solved only through structural reform and a 
new distribution of the goods of the State, which will be likely delayed by the 
corrupt elite. Therefore, on the one hand it is not impossible that the lack of 
basic changes will bring about in these countries a new wave of demonstrations, 
similar to those currently going on in Egypt, and the „Arab Spring” will be 
followed by another ,,Arab Season”. On the other hand, the chaos and instability 
– which we can see in Libya, Egypt or Yemen, and which contribute to the 
serious decline of economy and incomes – can also become a retarding force. 
According to some economists, the direct ,,price” of the „Arab Spring” reached 
the 56 billion USD only in Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria until 
October, which means that the total loss of the region is hundreds of billions of 
dollars.
15
 The Arab population can see that the willingness and the opportunities 
of the international community to donate billions of dollars for the recovery and 
the rebuilding of the region are limited. Libya is lucky because Gaddafi’s 
unimaginable amount of savings – at least 100 billion USD, but the real amount 
can be the double
16
 – can give a great impetus to the economy. But it is 
questionable whether who will finance the necessary structural reforms of 
Egypt, Tunisia and the other Arab states. Therefore, the citizens of the Maghreb 
states will consider twice whether they want a real revolution or they are 
satisfied with moderate reforms, with a little bit more money without more 
political freedom. 
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The resistants – Syria and Bahrain 
At first sight, we cannot see too much similarity in the events in Syria and 
Bahrain. But the basic political answers of the regimes and the power relations 
in the two countries are the same: both regimes declared that they will not 
contribute to the structural changes, and according to the current situation, it is 
not too likely that the protesters can reach serious successes here. 
 The reasons, of course, are different. Bahrain is one of the main scenes of 
the Shiite-Sunni – and Saudi-Iranian17 – conflict in the Middle East. 
Furthermore, the base of the 5
th
 US Fleet can be found here, so the geopolitical 
importance of Bahrain for Washington is unquestionable. The Shiite majority of 
Bahrain would have been probably strong enough to overthrow the monarch, 
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. However, this was unacceptable for both the USA 
and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudi army – officially in the framework of GCC 
and on the request of King Hamad – marched in the country and suppressed the 
riot. The events in Bahrain demonstrated well that besides – and if it is 
necessary, in contrast to – the catchwords of democracy and freedom, the 
Western powers defend their geopolitical interests in the region. 
 In Syria the circumstances are different, but the results are the same. 
Although the demonstrations have been going on since March, the protesters 
were not able to force President Asad to leave his position. The EU sanctions 
and the decision of the Arab League to suspend the membership of Damascus in 
the organization do not seem enough to enforce the changes in Syria.
18
 In 
contrast to Libya, most of the population does not want a regime change, and the 
intensity of the fighting is low. The opposition is divided and there is no such 
kind of central and recognized authority as the Libyan NTC. The fact that 
demonstrators were not able to form a united platform against the regime proves 
that their opportunities are limited. Asad tries to be careful and he does not use 
as brutal and open violence against the protesters as Gaddafi did. The 
international community is also divided. It is almost sure that the UN Security 
Council will not accept sanctions against Syria, and the demonstrators cannot 
expect such robust foreign support as the NTC in Libya. A huge part of the 
society supports the regime and condemns the riots and some analyses state that 
the fall of Asad could lead to an endless civil war between the different religious 
groups (Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Christian, Alawite) similarly to Iraq.
19
  
 To sum up the situation, the leadership has a stable power in both 
countries. In Bahrain, the Saudi and US presence is a guarantee for the survival 
of the Kingship. In Syria the opposition is divided and unorganized. The 
overthrowing of Asad would be possible only by an increased external pressure, 
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but currently there is no state really insisting on the fall of the President – 
mainly, because nobody sees what could come after the rule of the Alawites. 
  
Egypt and Yemen – leader change instead of regime change 
The dynamics of the „Arab Spring” can be very well followed by the 
events in Egypt, one of the key – if not the key – countries of the region. Egypt 
was the second scene of the Arab unrest, and the demonstrators reached the 
overthrow of Mubarak relatively quickly. The Egyptian President was an 
emblematic figure of the Arab World. He received serious Israeli and American 
support and had good relations both with the EU and the Arab nations. The fall 
of Mubarak symbolized the strength of the protesters, who were capable of 
overthrowing a dictator in contrast to the willing of the great powers. 
 But the symbol remained only a symbol. The failure of Mubarak did not 
bring radical transformation in the political life of Egypt. The army remained the 
most powerful actor in the internal policy and any change can happen only with 
the agreement of the Military Council. The attempts to put the army under the 
rule of the civil administration have failed. The economy stagnated, and millions 
of Egyptian citizens remained poor and dissatisfied. The structure of the 
economic and the political system of the Mubarak era was untouched. The death 
of hundreds of protestors contributed to the fall of the dictator, but it was not 
enough to break the power of the military and the economic elite. The prominent 
figures of the ,,new” regime – Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Kamal Ganzouri or 
Sami Hafez Anan – were the key persons of the former dictatorship. The 
Military Council has the support of the US and Israel. This support is likely to 
be increased after the success of Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour 
Party.
20
 
 The citizens recognized this tendency, which led to a new wave of 
demonstrations in mid-November. In the ,,free” Egypt, dozens of people died 
during the unrests.
21
 Although the Military Council appointed a new 
government, it was only a tactical step. The key question is how the balance of 
forces will change between the military leadership and the ever stronger Islamist 
groups in the next month during the elections. Unfortunately it seems that the 
liberal opposition in Egypt is too week and divided to provide a realistic 
alternative between the Islamists and the army. 
 The situation is worse in Yemen. In the deeply fragmented society, 
President Saleh was the symbol of unity: he was the only person who was 
capable of holding together the North and the South, the Shiites and the Sunnis. 
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The centrifugal power of the inner policy was already strong in the ‘90s, but 
after the al-Qaeda and the Salafist groups had more and more influence in ,,Felix 
Arabia”, the position of the central government became critical. What we can 
see in Yemen was not an uprising against a dictator, but a civil war against the 
unified Yemen. The current processes will not bring peace and welfare for the 
country, but rather a further disintegration of the state. Yemen is the second 
most important base of the al-Qaeda and the global Jihad (after the AfPak 
mountains) and the anarchy will only support the operations of the terror 
organization.
22
  
 Furthermore, the situation of the political leaders is the same as in Egypt. 
The current acting president, who serves until the January elections, is Abd 
Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, the former Vice-President of Saleh. The ministers of 
defense, oil and foreign affairs also could retain their posts.
23
 What happened in 
Yemen was not a ,,revolution”, but a new chapter of a prolonged, low intensity 
civil war, which is obviously the success of the separatist, the Jihadist, the 
Salafist, and the al-Qaeda. 
Regime change in Libya   
The death of Gaddhafi in October meant a big relief both for the NTC and 
the external actors. But the future of Libya remained questionable. What went 
off in the country was not a revolution, but a civil war. Although the media tried 
to show the events as a national uprising against the dictator, it was in fact a 
civil war between the different tribes of Libya. Fortunately, the leaders of the 
western tribes recognized soon that – because of the international pressure and 
the NATO air campaign – there was no way back to the former regime and 
Gaddafi had to go. But it is unsure how long this peace can be sustained. The 
support of the NTC is limited, and the fragmentation among the different 
opposition groups – the fighters of the western mountains, who occupied Tripoli 
or the militias of Misrata, which suffered the most serious casualties – is strong. 
As we could see – besides the liberal politicians who came home from 
emigration – we can find mujahideens among the leaders of the militias. In 
addition, there are serious tensions between the civil administration and the 
military commanders. The circumstances of the death of Gaddafi showed that 
the NTC was not able to regulate the armed groups; and in contrast to its 
promises it could not capture the dictator alive.
24
 When Minister of Interior 
Mahmoud Jibril tried to extend his authority to the militias, he faced serious 
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resistance.
25
 The lack of effective central power is proved by the torture and 
execution of the captured pro-Gaddafi troops.
26
 
 Other important condition for a successful transition would be the state-
building, but it is being delayed. The lack of civil society means that the main 
driving forces of the changes are the tribes, which queries the perspectives of the 
structural reforms. The current aims of the NTC and the external actors – the 
creation of a democratic, open Libya – are unrealistic because of the lack of 
necessary conditions. Gaddafi was very careful and he did not leave place for 
any resistance or organized opposition, including the creation of civil society. 
Egypt and Tunisia have strong middle classes and opposition, civil 
organizations, as well as influential emigrant groups abroad. All of these are 
lacking in Libya. Chairman of the NTC, Abdul Jalil and the first Prime Minister, 
Mahmoud Jibril were prominent members of the Gaddafi regime. The difference 
between Egypt and Libya is that Libya has no alternative leaders, while Egypt 
could have. Libya has a huge amount of money from the assets of the Gaddafi-
family. But there are no assurance that the 100 billion USD will really serve the 
rebuilding and welfare of the country. The transition is too slow and the citizens 
are dissatisfied. The centrifugal powers are strong and the lack of effective 
central government can jeopardize the creation of a new state-system. The worst 
case scenario is that the different factions will not be able to find a compromise, 
and the civil war will continue. We can only hope that after the bloody war 
against the pro-Gaddafi forces, all actors want to avoid further fighting. 
Tunisia – what kind of revolution? 
At the end of our exploration we find only one country in the Arab World 
where the buds of real changes have appeared. This is Tunisia. After the long 
months of insecurity and instability, the victory of the Ennahda Party seems to 
give new direction to the political system of the country. But it is a big question 
what will be this direction. Although the Ennahda promised that they would 
practice moderate governance, it is very hard to say what this actually means. 
The organization has good relations with the Hamas, and the two groups had a 
common rally on 13 November 2011. The voice of the Ennahda at the meeting 
was in sharp contrast to the official statements the party communicated to the 
West. The Ennahda’s general secretary Hammadi Jebali – who has been recently 
proposed by the party to be the new Prime Minister of Tunisia – said that the 
event was ,,a divine moment in a new state and ,hopefully, in a 6
th
 caliphate”, 
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and ,,the liberation of Tunisia will, God willing, bring about the liberation of 
Jerusalem.”27 
 As we stated, the Islamists played a marginal role in the outbreak of the 
unrests. But the situation has changed in the recent months. The liberal 
opposition was divided and faint. Their ideas have no deep roots in the tradition 
of the Arab states and they have limited support at home. Although the Western 
states try to back them, the citizens of the region do not trust in the external 
actors, because they had made it possible for the dictators to have a stable rule 
for decades. The problems of the region need organized leadership which is 
capable and willing to face the challenges and is brave enough to use radical, 
unorthodox solutions if necessary; currently the Islamists can meet these 
demands. 
 And not only the moderate Islamists can meet them. As we could see in 
Egypt, the Salafist received serious support, too. In Egypt the moderate Islamist 
party, the Freedom and Justice Party – the Party of the Brotherhood – has good 
relations with the Salafists, and there is no doubt that if it needs, the Brother-
hood will choose the other Islamist party for a coalition, not the liberal ones. 
 It seems that the downfall of the dictators can be followed only by the rule 
of Islamists in most countries of the region. The basic question is which way of 
governance will there be. One of the two options is the strengthening of radical 
elements, which we have already known from Afghanistan or Iran. The other is 
a new, hybrid way of political system with the unification of the sharia, the 
Islamic and local traditions and the experiences of the Western governance. It is 
sure that the European model of liberal democratic political system cannot work 
in North Africa. But elements of the Turkish system can be useful for the new 
governments. The complete copy of this model is not possible, but the way 
ahead for the Arabs can be similar. 
 There are many examples for the unlimited rule of sharia, but there are 
only few examples for the creation of new type of governance which unifies the 
advantages of the Islamic and the Western legacy. Furthermore, in the Maghreb 
we need a model containing the local political and cultural traditions, too, which 
is different in each country. It is not a simple task, but there is no other 
acceptable alternative for the state-building in the region. 
Conclusion 
The „Arab Spring” brought about the downfall of dictators who had been 
ruling for decades. But the overthrow of the tyrant does not automatically mean 
freedom. Most of the unrests in the Arab World did not lead to revolution. The 
structures of the political and economic system have not changed yet, and the 
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roots of the conflicts have sustained. The external actors could not provide 
adequate answers to the challenges of the region, and the movements of the 
North African countries went back to their traditions. In the first anniversary of 
the beginning of the „Arab Spring”, it seems that the main ideological 
background of the transformation is Islamism. The question is whether the 
successful Islamist political parties of the region will choose the moderate, 
hybrid way of political system or they will give in to the pressure of the radicals.  
 Finally, we can see the second wave of the „Arab Spring”, e.g. in Egypt, 
where the population is fed up with the rule of the key persons of the former 
dictator. In addition, if the situation becomes worse in Syria and Yemen, it can 
cause a further escalation of the local conflicts. All of these phenomena show 
that the unrests of the „Arab Spring” have not yet finished, and the consolidation 
needs much more time. 
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Abstract:  
 
Terrorism is evolving in the new millennium, and so are the ways that terrorists 
finance their activities.  While large attacks can be accomplished with relatively 
small amounts of money, terrorists continue to diversify their sources of funding. 
Terrorism in Afghanistan is funded by a variety of sources including donations, 
drug trafficking, kidnapping, and corruption. The Haqqani network is one of the 
most dangerous terrorist networks in Afghanistan, and has strong ties to many 
financial sources. Efforts are underway to enhance the Afghan government’s 
ability to interdict terrorist financing, but due to the weak government structure 
and the ubiquitous nature of corruption in the country, the future of those efforts 
is uncertain. 
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Introduction 
In this article we introduce the reader to some basic concepts about the 
financing of terrorism. The first part of the article – written by Prof. Istvan 
Laszlo Gal of the University of Pecs – provides a general overview of terrorist 
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